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The editors have offered me this opportunity for a rejoinder to
Mr. Campisi's response to my article on the new Civil Disturbance Regu-
lations.' I have chosen to reply on only a few points, inviting the
reader to review both the original article and Mr. Campisi's response
with greater care.
My several earlier articles on the general topic of military troops
and civil disorders have dealt not only with the use of federal troops
but with the use of troops by the states as well. The principle which I
distilled from the English history and precedents, requiring that mili-
tary troops when used in civil disorders be subordinated to ordinary local
civil authorities and laws, is a principle that carries no connotations
hostile to American federalism. Applied to our polity, it means that
federal troops must be subordinated to federal officials, state troops to
state officials (and also to federal officials insofar as prescribed by the
supremacy clause).' Campisi is quite wrong in his assertion that I
have claimed that command of troops by "a national rather than a local
official" constitutes those troops a "distinctively military force."'
Moreover, by stressing the impracticality of sheriff or marshal
command of troops in modern circumstances, Campisi too easily de&-
precates the importance of the traditional requirement of "local" civilian
control. The federal government and the state governments of course
have power to reorganize their respective civilian law enforcement struc-
tures. Sheriffs and marshals were the familiar officers of law enforce-
ment in the early United States, as sheriffs had been in England, and the
posse tradition, including the civilian use of troops, was formulated
in that context. But states can establish, or authorize municipalities to
establish, police forces or other officials or agencies to which the con-
stitutional tradition of "local" civilian control must adapt. So also may
the federal government with respect to its duties to enforce federal law.
For these reasons I wrote to Mr. Campisi, while his article was in prep-
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aration, the following observations which he seems to have disregarded:
[Y]ou seriously misunderstand my articles on this subject if you
think I advocate a return to the quaint old pre-1878 posse-comitatus
practice. What is of concern to me is the constitutional principle
that personnel used in civil law enforcement must be viewed, for
all legal purposes, as civilian and not as military personnel. That,
and not the trappings of posse status or marshal leadership, is the
essential constitutional requisite that was respected by, but is not
necessarily peculiar to, the pre-1878 practice. SCRAG leadership
may be more desirable than marshal leadership, I certainly agree;
and adequate SCRAG in lieu of marshal leadership certainly is
not unconstitutional. Neither, however, is SCRAG leadership by
itself sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements.....
The old troop posse practice happened to comport with these re-
quirements. A different and more modem practice, if equally con-
sistent with these requirements, would certainly be preferable.'
The states for purposes of state law enforcement, and the United States
for purposes of federal law enforcement, are competent to restructure
their respective law enforcement structures. They may even provide
exceptional or more centralized structures for employment in unusual
exigencies. Whatever structure is adopted, however, it is not to be
displaced or superseded by military forces that are called in to render
law enforcement aid. That, and not any archaic forms, is the essential
substance of the historic requirement of subordination to ordinary
"local" civilian authorities.
The fact that King George III might have had power as sovereign
in conformity with the laws of England to shunt aside lesser magistrates
in execution of the laws does not mean that the President or a governor
has power to do the same in this country today. It depends upon the
statutes and constitution of the nation or the state. If the President or
governor has no power to do so when he makes no use of troops, for
him to claim power to supersede other authorities by virtue of his use
of troops would be offensive to the rule of civilian due process for which
I have argued. It is for this reason that the actions of the King in the
Gordon and Bristol riots are of less significance as precedent than
the opinions of Mansfield and Tindal justifying those actions by refer-
ence to the posse tradition.
I find most curious Campisi's assertion that the practice of using
federal troops as a posse originated with the opinion of Attorney Gen-
eral Cushing in 1854. I had found persuasive evidence to the contrary.
Cushing, from my research, hardly seems to have been a proponent of




enlarged military power on the domestic scene; an opinion of his as
Attorney General in 1857- was inhospitable to some of the militaristic
pretensions of Civil War and Reconstruction radicals, although not
so much so as the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Milligan.' More
significant, Cushing's 1854 opinion7 certainly purports to be a reflection
of a traditional practice rather than the inauguration of something new.
In addition, the 1878 opinion of a succesor Attorney General' also
attests to the historicity of the practice. Moreover, a long-established
equivalent practice in the states is attested to by the 1855 Massachu-
setts Supreme Court decision in Ela v. Smith.' It is my view that
chapter 28, section 9 of the Act of May 2, 1792"0 (a provision which in
context pertains to the use of the military, and is in addition to the civ-
ilian posse authorization of the Act of September 24, 1789, chapter 2011)
was intended to make the state practice, derived from the Mansfield
doctrine, a federal practice as well.' 2 Campisi would counter all of this
with an inference drawn from the fact that on certain occasions Presi-
dents Jefferson and Jackson sought special authorization from Congress
to employ troops under marshals. For a number of reasons, however,
such as confusion, doubt, political caution, or abundance of care,
special approval for a variety of actions is often sought when it is not
needed. To infer from this that the power was otherwise lacking is
quite unwarranted.
At one point at least, Campisi asserts that I claim that troops
cannot constitutionally be used to exeute laws in situations short of
insurrection. 8 That misstates my position. Troops may be used, I
maintain, but only as an essentially civilian force. This is a proposition
with which Campisi, after considerable equivocation, appears in the
end to agree. We differ, perhaps, over the factors that distinguish troops
as a civilian from troops as a military force, and over the question
whether the Nixon Civil Disturbance Regulations adequately ensure a
civilian force of soldiers for circumstaces short of insurrection.
Campisi seems to have fallen into confusion as to what uses of
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troops I find to be constitutionally precluded, and what uses I find to be
constitutional but poorly provided for by statute. Of the principal
federal statutes discussed in my Symposium article, there are some I
consider unconstitutional, others which I consider constitutional but
only if construed in light of their origin and legislative history rather
than as they have been applied in practice. However, I am hardly so
naive as to think it likely that "any court would follow Engdahl's theory
and hold that the federal government could not provide assistance to
a requesting state facing an urban riot of the type found in Detroit in
1967." 14 Neither do I argue that such judicial boldness is to be desired.
These statutes, inapt as they are, are all the Congress has provided
thus far. Modem needs and conditions have outstripped them and
shown up some of their faults. What is to be sought is not judicial
disablement of needed executive action in emergencies (although dis-
abling decisions under these statutes would be justified), but, rather,
new and mature legislative attention to the problems of providing
adequate powers for dealing with civil disorders while at the same time
better protecting indispensable historic safeguards of civilian due
process.
14 Id. at 765.
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